Kl'I'i li MufUgafl am/Barry Smith Mach and Ehrenfels: The Foundations of Gestalt Theory! § l. Preamble One unportllnt measure of the success of a philosophy of scie nce is ti\{: extent to which the chui fi ca tions which it yields have positive a nd (ruilrul consequcnce!> within the scicrlCe!> themselves. Such sliccess is a t least in part a function of the exte nt towhichitsexamples and problems m e t:tken over from genuine science and arc not merely trivial OJ ove r-simplified illustrations. Thc thought o f Mach in pa rticular , and of A u!>triao philosophers of science in genaal , provides liS with st rik ing examplesot ~uch intt.'ractton. Mach's epistemology and ont ology grew out o f his invc!>tiga(ions. both systcmatic and historical, ,n physics and psychol(1g). and they contributed in turn to the further de velopmen t o f his O\\.II thinking in these areas and 10 the wo rk or those, ~uch as Einste in And Ehrenfeb, whom he influenced, Simila rly, it was the int~raclion he tween philosophy and psychology which made possihle the seminal work on tht notion of Gestalt quality by Ehrenfel s, and th is work , togethe r with the writings on the logic and ontology of parts. wholesa nd sHuctures by other members of the Brentano school, led in lIlrn to sign ificant further developments. not only in psychology itself, but also in neighbouring discipline~ !>uch as linguistics, ~ We shall find in wbat follows that wc can co me to terms wit h thl', impl iGlt ions of the ideas of Mach and Eh renfcls o n the pe rception ofwhru IS complex and on thccomplexity of perception only by paying(!speci:JU)' delailed a ({ention to their respectivc understandings of t he no tio n of '1,0,,causal dependellce. The clarification of thi s notion fir st effected in 13 truly systematic way in the writings of these lwO author~ and in th ose of their contemporaries Brcntano and Stumpf is, we shall ;lrgue, (l rH;:oftbe great achievements of Austrian philosophy of scie nce. Mach, it wili lUm out , was unable successfully to incorpoT<ltc hi ~ descr iptions 01 c(l mple, 124 perception \vithin his ge neral atomistic frame wo rk in nQ sma.ll part ~use his understanding of depe nde nce was in a quite speci fi c sense COO narrow, The gn:at significance o f thc work o f E hre nfds and of Olb~r me mbe rs of th e Srentano tradition from our point o f view is th aL b«ausc they we re more faithful to the strUClllres of what is given in pe r* a ption , they were able Lo develop a richer theory of depende nce. th e Implica tio ns of which were to cxtt;',nd far beyond th c narrow sphcre of perceptua l psychology. §2. The Problem of the Perception o rCompJexe~ To (<Ilk of a 'perce ption of what is COll1 pltx' is . I'n) 111 the :lI omi sllc pc=. 'pcClive which held sway anHlI1gs1 the mHjo rit y of 19th ccnlll ry ps.vchologists. alre lldy to c mploy a fo rm of speech th il t is ill egitimate in the ~nse tha t it b no t grou nded in any Llnde rl yi ng rea li ty, T he re is at m '1, according I() th e ato Olj st ic psyc ho logist. the possibility of a summatiOIl o f sim ple pcrccivings. each one of which wo uld h,lYe ~OIcthing unitary or non-complex as its object orconte nt ,' Mach, tOO, embr<Jced lin a to mism o f th is kind , For him al t complexes, including the ego it~l f. are me re ideal, practica l Of provisio nal 'menLalcconomk unities'. As he.' puts if in the Alltl lysf' del' Emp[indllllgen , onl y t t' 'c lements ' (~ns<l liHns. £m"JiTldulIgetl ) are rea/. 4 But he d early saw that the re is <I problem of complex perceplio n / and E bre nfels, as is well knowll , was able to take cerwin passages from this wo rk as lhe stanin gpoiot o f his investigatio n of complex-perceplio n in his cl assic essay o f 1&)0, "Obel 'Gestaltqualita te n"' , T hese passages are not iso lated Iflstances o f what might he taken to be le:.s lhan careful th inking on Milch's part. Inde<o:d the exa mina tion (If Mach's writings reveals Ihat hb uOlidp.uio n o i Ehren{clsgocs back a ileasr2U ye.'lfsearlie r . O n receipt of Ehre ofels' p"per . M <rch replied ina k tte rtha t he had al rcady put forward tbc mai,n idc:ts al beit in a morc psychological wa)' . in (e rms of atheoryof ' muscul:tr se nsat ions' ill a ll ea rl ie r pllpe r. T he p;lpe l in q Ul'sl.io l1 is a lmost certai nly his" Bt"lIlcrkullgc n zu r Lehre rom raum liche n Seh\~n** of I g65. bacritica l d i~Cuss ion of the psychology o f He rhart, dealing spt'dficall y with the problem o f o ur rccognitio n of perce pu l<l l COlll ple'«(.'S, How, rvlach ask!' , du Wl~ recognize d iffe rent ~pi' !i::ll fig ure.'i ( 'CeJ(alffll ' ) iI~ Ihe ~atl\ e'? How does it collie abou t that we 125 , : .~ : I : : ;" , . 1': apparently recognize melodies as being alike? How is it that we recognize the form of a melody more easily than the key in which it is played'? Why is it that we recognize a rhythm more easily than an absolute duration') Where is the similarity between the individual, unitary qualities presented in the hearing of a melody played on a trumpet in the key of C, and those presented in the hearing of ' the same' melody played on a violin in G? Recognition and likeness here, as Mach points out, cannot depend on the q uaiities of the perceptual presentations [Vorstellungen 1, for these are differe nt. On the other hand recognition , acco rding to the principles of psychology, is possible only on the basis of presentations which are the same in quality (Mach 1865 , p. 122 ofrepr.. Eng. p.391. quoted in Schulzki , p.42). There is, Mach concludes , no other alternative but for us to consider thequalitativelydissimilar presentations in the two se ries as being necessarily connecled with some sort of qualitativc.1y similar presenta tions. (lac. cit. , o ur emphasis) Mach, that is to say , claims that thereis a means of solving the problem of complex perception within the atomistic framework by means of an appeal to additional elementary sensations outside the sphere of perception, sensations he caJls Muskelempji:ndungen. When we hear the same melody in two different keys, our apprehension of this 'sameness' rests on the fact that, for all the differences in tone-sensations , the same feeling-sensations are involved in both cases. On a trivial interpretation, Mach here is presenting a view according to which our experience enjoys a certain sort of doubl e structure, each separate experience of the individual tones in a melody or of the points in a spatial figure is coloured by a certain element of feeling. It remains the case that , on this modified view of 'element', experience is just one damn ed element after another. Such a view is indeed able to solve the problem of identity of complex objects of experience, at least for simple cases, but it is not only this problem which an account of our perception of what is complex is called upon to resolve. Such an account must explain also the unity ofcomplexes tha t is given in experience, and it must do justice to the fact that complexes are given in such a way as to be demarcated from other, neighbouring complexes in such a way as to form unified and integral wholes. And Mach 's account, on this interpretation , is inadequate to features such as this. There is, however, another, more subtle interpretation of Mach's 126 position, the possibility of which we almost certainly owe to Ehrenfels, since it consists in a certain se nse in reading back Ehrenfels' ideas on Gestalt qualities into the relevant Machian texts. According to this interpretation , it is not the successive elementary successions, but rather each apparent complex perception th a t comes to be associated with its own characteristic feeling-sensation or nervous quale. The existence of similarities between such quale can then explain both how it is that we can enjoy the appearance of what is putatively the same complex even where the associated elementary data of perception are in fact distinct, and also how it is that the apparent complex in question is given as something uni tary and as something set apart from its environment. Thus when I see a square, for example, then in addition to the perceived elements (whether these be conceived as points, lines or segments) there is also a peculia r nervous sensation which I have as a result of the innervations of the muscles of my eyes, a sensation that is repeated , spontaneously an d without any effort on my part, whenever I see a similar figure . The body as a whole we might say , in consort with specific sensory presentatio ns of what is simple , is to do the job of accounting for our apparent presentation of what is complex. And we should, as Mach himself argues, look to the variety of the human organism, which is provisionally rich enough to cover the out.1ays ofpsyc\1ology in this regard and it is high time that we took seriously the talk of 'bodily resonance' in which psychology hasso readily engaged. (1865,loc.ci[., Eng. p.392)7 Now an account of this kind works well enough, on its own terms, in relation to our (apparent) perceptions of congruent but differently colou red spatial shapes (space and shape, we note, a re the subject-matter of Mach 's 1865 paper). Each such shape can indeed be seen as being associated - 'necessarily connected' , as Mach puts it with its own characteristic muscular innervation, itself derived from corresponding motor processes of the eye and head. (Modern-day psychologists, with their investigation of the role of the kinaesthetic dimension in experience, have at least to some extent vindicated Mach in this regard.) We are interested, however , in a general theory of complex perception. Indeed Mach himself writes: Just as the same, differently coloured forms, the same muscular sensations . must occur if the forms are to be recognized as the same, so too each and every form, 127 t ( I , ; ! . each and cvery abs traction , as one might say , must in just the same way be bascd upon presentations of a quite particular quality. This holds true for space and shape, as we ll as fortime, rhythm, pitch, theform of meiodies, intensity , (lod so on. (toe. cit. ,Eog. p. 391f.) Mach assumes , that is to say, that it is possible to generalize the theory of muscular sensations to encompass all senso ry dimensions. More, th atit is in principle possible to ex trapolate from this theory in such a way as to encompas~ our apparent presentation )f a1l 'Abstraktionen' from what is given .8 E h renfels , too , recognized the necess ity of such a general til oryof complex perception. Y But he saw a lso and this was a significant achievement of "Uber 'GestaltqualiUiten'" that a complete ly gene ral theory could not be o btaine d on the basis of an appeal to additional elementa ry phenomena a long the lines of Mach's muscul a r sensations . For such sensations can at best explain our apparent perception of what is complex only in relation to what is non-temporal , of what is capable of being presented instantaneously, i. e. simple spatial figures , si mple smells , simple musical chords. There is no way in which an appeal to extra e lementary (and thus instantaneous) sensations alone can solve the onto logical problem raised by our (apparent) perception of temporally extended, unitary complexes such as me lody and rhythm , and in genera l of all G estalten involving change a nd motion. For there is clearly no answer to the question as to when a single c.kmentary fee ling-sensationputa tively associated with a plurality of elementa ry perceptions spread out in time could beco me associated with this plurali ty in the relevant way. 11l T he e lementa ry innervation (or what have yo u) can do service for the perception of what is compl ex o nly if it is somehow associated with (Ill relevant pe rcepti om. This association can come about , however, nly if these perceptions are alre ady collected together, e .g . through the operations of memo ry , to form a ."ingle and instan taneo us co mposite percept ion . B ut the ap peal to such a compOSit e perception clearly signifies a departure from the atomistic perspective . Moreover , once ouch composites have b "l:n accepted , it is dift.'icul t to see wh at explan atory rolecou!d remai n for any as~oci' teel muscularinncrva li n*. For reasons to be investiga ted only later, Mach need no t acknowledge thal this argument has isolated any in'ldequacy in hi account. since he rejects the notion f t im as t raditiona lly concei ved; th very concept * of 12R simultaneity and non-simultaneity are beJd by him to correspond to no underlying reality. It is not , however, this inadequacy of Mach's account which will be of interest to us here. O ur attention will be directed , ra ther , toward the nature of the rela tion between muscular and perceptual quafe that is presupposed by h is theory. §3. The Analysis of Sensations The theory of Muskelempfindungen of 1865 is no t simply abandoned by Mach in his later writings . Many ohhe same ideas are at work also in the A.nalyse der Empfindungen, though now the theory of muscular sensations has been extended legitim ately or not to e mbrace a taxonomy of different kinds of 'space-sensations ', ' time-sensations ' and in principl e also muscular inne rvations of othe r sorts illustrating Mach's faith in the 'power and variety of the human organism'. Thus consider the following passage quoted by Ehrenfels at the beginning of his paper: In melodic as well as in harmonic combinations, notes whose rates of vibration bear to one another some simple ratio are distinguished (1) by their agreeableness, and (2) by a sensation characteristic of this raiio. (1886 , p.l30) I J Such distinctiveness manifests itself also in our forms of expression: Colours, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times and so forth are connected with one another in manifold ways; and with them are associated moods of mind , feelings and volitions . Out of this fabric, that which is relatively more fixed and permanent stands prominently forth , engraves itself in the memory, and expresses itself in language. (1886 , p.2 , Eng. p .2) What is missing from the Analyse der Empfindungen and this is a crucial development is any talk of a 'necessary connection ' or ' intimate mutual rela tion ' such as we find in the 1865 account. 12 We now lea rn only that the characteristic sensat ions are 'connected to ' or 'dependent on' the e lements with which they are associated . Further, this dependence is seen as being in every case relative to the perspective or point of view adopted by the invest igator: 129 " '. A co lour is a physical object as long as we consider its cie,pe nci e nce upon its luminous source (other colours , heat, spaces, etc . ). But if we consider its dependence upon the re tina . .. th en it is a psychological o bj eet . a se nsation. (1886, p.B, Eng. p. 17 .) We shall turn below to the task of examining in detail just what Mach understood by 'dependence' he re. For the moment it is sufficie nt to note th at it is not any sort of causal relation. Causality is rejected by Mach as a metaphysical enCUl11 bra nee , an anth ropomorphic notion, properly to be e limi na ted from any science th at is WOt1 hy of the name. §4. On Gestalt Qualities E hrenfels, too, employs a not ion of non*-causal dependence in his tbeory, But for him it is the Gestalt qualities themselves , certa in sui generis objects of presentation, whi ch are dependent on the data of sensation which are their foun da tion . Ehrenfels seeks to be faithful to the reality (veridica lity) of our perception of what is complex. There is something there, he insists, which we perceive through specific types of complex networks of acts of presentation (pe rceptio n , memory and imagina tion) of what is simple , whenever we perceive a melody , a rhythm , or any other Gestalt quality. A nd he claims further th at , to produce a truly faithful account of our perception of such formations, we have to distinguish objects of perception on two dis tinct leve ls. Ehrenfels recognizes not only complexes of elemen tary perceptual da ta but also specia l qualities of such complexes, and the formations we perceive are such as to involve both. Just as for Mach , if two fi gures are similar , then this is because of an identity in the appurtenan t neIVCprocesses or feeling-sensations , so also for Ehrenfels , if two figures are si mila r , then this is because of an identity in their associated Gestalten . . 13 Ehrenfels is explicit that this identity is to be explained by appeal to unitary presentational elements: when we hear a melody consisting of 8 notes, then the re are (at least) nine presentatio ns invo lved, 8 aural presentations of individual notes , and one unitary presentation of the associated Gestalt quality, 14 E hrenfels acknowledges that the note~ cons titute in and of themselves a ce11ain complex whole, and that the 130 esta lt qualitv is fo unded upon (is, precisely, a 'quality of) this complex whole. But the quality its If is not a whole embracing the individual ensa tional ele ments as parts: a view of this sort was developed only with the work of ertheimer and the other members of the Berlin School, In this re p ct Ehrenfels , like Mach, can be said to ha e offe red an e Jementa rist so lut ion to the problem of complex percept ion. For Ehrenfels , as for Mach , no special intellectual effort , attention or a ttitude is n dcd to protluce the awareness of a Gestalt quality : this awareness occurs as it were au tom aticallv, The problem of the 'un iversal given ness of Gesta lt qualiti s with t he ir foundat ions' is however a complex one. Eh renfels asse rts that wherever a complex which can se rve a, the founda tion for a Ge *talt Ljuaiity is prc ent ill consci( u~ nes', this quality is itself eo ipso and without any con tri bu tion o n our part <J Iso given in co nsciousness (p III , above). This rem ark re lates only to the issue of th e genesis of Gestalt quali ties, to the question whether, on the basis of a given fo undation, any activity or as, i tance is required on ou r part in order to bring a Gestalt quality to co nsciousness, Thus Ehrenfels points out that , at least in certain cases, ' the exertion we seem to require in order to grasp a shape or me lody Oil the basis of a foundation already prese nted is much rather appli" d to the filling out of th at fou ndat ion itself' (p . 111 . above) H e considers our perception of pain tings, whe re sensa tion yields merely a star t ing point for further imaginative filling out : A significant exercise of our capacities is required in order to utili ze in o ll r presentatio n the slight distinctions in light and colour and the foreshortenings in the perspective p lane as associa tive tok ens for the realiza tio n of the to tal lumi nosi ty and three-dimensionali ty of the painti ng . (pp. lilt. , above) But effort is needed , Ehrenfels argues , only in order to fix the indirectly seen par ts of the whol e. So meone who has developed in his co nscio usness the foundation for the Gestalt quality in the approp ri a te way will not find it necessary to ge nerate this quality itst' lf in a furth e r ac t and nor wilt he have any choice as to which quality will be generated : the quality is , as it were, given of itse lf. Ehrenfe ls ' views on the genesis of Gestalt qualities are in this respect identica l to tbose of Mach on the genes is of muscular innervations. There is, however , in add ition to the quest ion of the genes is of Gestalt 131 qualities also another question, that of the ontological status of such qualities, and oftheirconstitutive relations to the sensory data with which they are associated. \5 Ehrenfels was perhaps the first to consider this problem in a serious way. He points out that if we assert a mutual dependence of Gestalt quality and foundation not merely in the genetic but also in this ontological sense, then this gives rise immediately to a problem of infinite mul tiplication . Mutual ontological foundation would signify first of all, harmlessly enough, that every Gestalt quality is necessarily such that it could not exist unless there exists also a corresponding complex of fundamenta . But it would signify also that every complex of fundamenta, too , is necessarily such that it could not exist unless an associated Gestalt quality existed also. Every arbitrary complex of given sensations, however delineated , would give rise to a Gestalt quality of its own. This would imply, however, that we would once more be in no position to explain that characteristic unity and integrity of perceptual complexes which is in fact experienced. Thus to hear a melody (e.g.) would be to hear also all constituent sub-melodies (and indeed, unless constraints on temporal and spatial proximity are introduced , all melodies built up on the basis of presently perceived tones together with tones previously heard). But further, since Gestalt qualities are themselves perfectly valid objects of presentation which may themselves serve as fundaments of further Gestalt qualities , it would follow that, on hearing asequence (5 l' 52" " ,s,) of tones, we have not only the Gestalt quality, saY!1 which these immediately generate, but also the further Gestalt qualities!2 generated by the sequence (s \' S2 " " ,snJ1) the quality!} generated by the sequence (SI' S2"" ,S I1 JI'!2) and so 011. Now clearly, as Ehrenfels would say , there is nothingof all of this given in inner perception. And he concludes that, in the ontological sense, Gestalt qualities are merely one-sidedly dependent on their fundamenta. 16 Mach seems notto have faced this problem , even though it arises in the self-same way within the framework of his own nervous quaLe theory . He seems, rather, to have run together the genetic and the ontological dimensions and thereby to have been constrained to accept mutual dependence both in the genetic and in the ontological sense. As Smith points out in his essay above, the Meinongians accepted it in neithersphere, insisting on a one-sided dependence both genetically and ontologically. Thus they held first of all that Gestalt qualities (now called 'founded contents' and later 'higher order objects ', or 'objects of presentations of e.xtra-sensory provenance ') are one-sidedly 132 ontologically dependent ('founded') on their fundamenta or 'inferiora'. But they held also th at such qualities are in need of being produced for presentation by a speci al exertion of consciousness , that the Gestalt quality must in a certain sense be teased out of the perceptual environment. \7 We might display the essentials of Ehrenfels ' account in the form of a diagram , somewhat as follows: Diagraml. ",mpl" - -I presentation i Ges lalt presentat ion individua l se nsory individual sensory pre sentations data ~t--j-- ~ ~ - ,ompl" pbJ'" ~ ~ i of presentation I I I I I I il iJ ~-r-el-at-iO-l1-S~Of/8dependence Gestalt 1 Quality Here the arrows represent relations of intentional directedness (between an act and its object) , and the double lines represent relations of mutual dependence as in the diagrams all pp. 40, 47 etc. above. 133 Mach's theory, on the other hand , on the inte rpre tation here advanced, might look like this : Diagram 2. chara teris! ic sensation sensory Elemente - rela tion of dependence Jt i . of course the differences between thcs two figures that leap to the eye. The most important o f these are : (1) Where act ancl o bject are di ti nguished by EhrenfeJs and the other Br ntanists , M ach embraces a conception of Efemente according to which sensory presentations and sensory data are not separate but arc rather run togeth e r into a single uni tary item . (2) Mach 's atomism did not allow him to embrace e ither com plex presentations or complex objects of presentation such as are to be fo und in the Ehrenfe ls theory . In this paper however we shall be concentrating on what the two acc unts have in common . For not only is it the case that Ehrenfelsian Gestal t quali ties and Machian characte ristic sensations pe rform the same job; bo th are also such as to stand to their r pective und rl ying lementary da ta in the peculiar relation of non-causal dependence refer red to above . The investigation of thi s relation has a more th an paroc hial in terest. Notions of non-causal dependence form indispensable com ponent!> not onl y of Mach's psycho.logy anc! of the psychology of Ehrenfe ls , but a lso of th work of otherthinke rs in the Brentano tradition , particularly Stum pf, Meinong and Husser! , from where they exerted a wide influence, to a degree which has still hardly bee n appreci a ted . l~ Mol' important still, however , if our argume nts are correct , are the implication s of a 134 demonstration ofthe inadequacy of an account of dependence of the sort defended by Mach . For this account and its derivatives have been an unquestioned presupposition of almost all subsequent philosophy of scie nce . To call it into question is to call into question a still powerful orthodoxy . §s. Mach's Philosophy of Science Mach is widely acknowl edged as having been thefirst thinkerto combine philosophical clarification, history of science and substantive scientific research in ways that are recognizable as philosophy of science as this is nowadays unde rstood . He stands a t the beginning of that strand in the history of Austrian philosophy which reaches its culmination (or its nadir) in the logical positivism ofthe Vienna circle. But the re is another , one might almost say phenomenological, aspect to his thinking. All Mach 's arguments, howe ver they are to be classified , are rigorously subordinated by him to a single goal: the goal of increasing knowfedge. 19 He is quite prepared to renounce any claim to the epithets 'physicist' o r 'philosophe r' if this contributes to the advancement of our understanding of the world (( 1910) , p . ll, Eng. p .38) . He thereby stands in marked contrast to those philosophers and scientists who are all too ready to impose in advance requirements that enquiry has to satisfy ifit is to be 'scientific' , for example by foisting abstract 'criteria of rationality ' on live traditions of research. He shares with Husserl and others in the Brentano tradition the conviction that theoretical e nquiry cannot afford to lose sight of the origins of our ideas (scientific and otherwise). Scientific ideas , as Mach conce ives them , must have their origins in concepts called by him ' inaugurating concepts' de rived directly from experience (and , like the phenomenologists, Mach was prepared to acknowledge the role played by introspection in the foundations of scientific enquiry). The science of heat, he argues, is derived from the concept offelt warmth , the science of light rrom the conce pt of intensify of illumination, the science of acoustics from the concept offrequency, and so on. I II Mach shares with members of the phenomenological tradition a conception of the philosophy of science as something that must be tied to the actual practice of science . As Husser! puts it: 'A fruitful theory of 135 concept formation in the natural sciences can ... only be a theory " from below", a theory that has grown out of the work of the natural sciences themselves.' The passage occurs in the context of a discussion by Husser! of a monograph by the Neo-Kantian Rickert in which a conception of the philosophy of science is manifested 'which deals so much in general constructions, is so much a theory "fro m above", that not a single example is to be found in the entire monograph and nor does this absence make itself fe lt' (1979, p. 147). It is a recurring feature of Mach's deservedly famous conceptual analyses of the ontological commitments of scientists e.g. to space and time , that he proceeds by gradually stripping away from these all purely conceptual baggage, all metaphysical free play not directly related to sense experience and thereby arrives, step by step, at certain (as Mach conceives things) unambiguous and precise components, such as the inaugurating concepts mentioned above : I see the expression of. .. economy clearly in the gradual reduction of the statica l laws of machines to a single one , viz. , the principle of virtual work: in the replacement of Kepler 's laws by Newton's single law . .. and in the [subsequentJ reduction, simplification and clarification of the laws of dynamics. I see clea rly the biologico**economical adaptation of ideas, which takes place by the principles of continuity (permanence) and of adequate definiti on and splits the CO Il C.:pt 'hea t' into the two concepts of 'temperature' and 'quan tity of heat'; and I see how the concept 'quantity of heat' leads on to ' la tent heat', and to tbe concepts of 'energy ' and 'entropy ' . ((1910) , p.6f., Eng. p.33) H e argues at length for a view of science as a continuo us process of adaptation the biological echo here i de libe rate of thoughts to facts and of thoughts to thoughts , And the aim of this adaptation (though not its biological explanation) is shared also by members of the Brentano tradition: it is precisely the realization of the fundamental requirement of univocity (Eindeu(igkeit) of our ideas. 21 And finally he shared a concern for the presuppusitionlessness of description . Mach's attitude here is neatly captur d in WittgeJ ' tein's famous remark about psychology as con. isting in 'experimental meth d' , and conceptual confusions ' . 2" But th e conceptual confusions which were the targctsofMach 's poJemi s were all , he lh ugh t , the result of employing concepts --of time and space , of causality , of the ' in ner' and the 'outer' without any basis in expe rience and experiment. One of th most striking examples here is M a h 's discussion of the 'preconceived 136 op inions ' in the psychology of perception . These result, he claims, from a failure to examine perceiving itself, before transferring to the perceptual sphere , lock , stock a nd barrel , ideas derived from the sphere of physics (1903, eh. II). Husse r! got the main historical point exactly right in his comments on the use made of the 'phenomenological method' before the turn of the century by certain psychologists and natural scientists: The sense of this method for men such as M.ach and Hering lay in a reaction against the threat of groundlessness [gegel1 die drohende Bodenlosigkei/]; it was the reaction against a theorizing with tile help of conceptual formations and maihernatical speculation removed from intuition which brougl1t no clarity into the correct sense and achievement of theories (1962, p. 302) . and in this same passage Husserl stresses the similarity between the approach es of Mach and Hering on the one hand and that of Brentano on the other. 23 §6. Mach and the Brentano Tradition The emphasis on description and sense experience in Mach corresponds in the work of the Bre ntanian psychologists to the emphasis on the need to create a scientific psychology on the basis of the unprejudiced description of inner experience 2 4 The programme of descriptive as opp sed to genetic psychology was common to all first*generation descendants of Brentano . Descriptive psychology deals with what we have called above ontological dependence rclations and with associated structures in tbe sphere of conscious experiences. Genetic psychology deals rather with the coming and going of conscious xperiences and with associated causal structures. The programme of descriptive psychology finds one o f its most succinct formulations in Brentano's Meine ietzten Wunsch e flir Osterreich ((1895) , p.34), where Brentano describes the project of a 'combinator ic ' of the basic psychic components which would yie ld psychic ph 'nom na 'as letters yield words'. The rigorous validity (necessity) of the laws of such a combinatoric would be contrasted with the empirical or inductive validity of the laws of genetic psychology, i.c. the laws of succe slon o r of the coming and goingof psychic phenomena. 25 Mach's thought, and not least his theory of Elemente , might indeed be 137 descri bed as a working out of a related programme. For this theory rests on a strikingly similar conception of the connections and combinations of Elemcn(e : T he aim of a ll research is to ascertain the mode of connection of the elements .. For u.s colours, sounds, sp, ces, times .. . are the ultimate elements , whose given connection it is our busi ness to inv stigate. (1886, p.2l ; Eng. p22.) The antithesis of ego and world, sensation (pheno menon) and thlllg .. . vanishes , and we have simply to deal with the connection of the elements.. . of which this ant ithesis was o nly a partially appropriate and imperfect expression .. .. Science has simply to accept this connection, and to set itself a right (get its bea rings) in the in te llectuaJ en ironment which is hereby furnished, without attempting to explain i t~ ex i sten ce. (op .cil.,p. 10 , Eng .p .14.) The great diffe rence between the two programme. , OIl the other hand , is t hat , as a lready noted , the genetic and the ontological are simply run togeth r in Mach, who knows nothing of the dis tinction between g netic and descripti ve psychology of the Brentanists. We have emphasized that the notion of non .. causal dependence which lie: at the root of Mach's theory is a notion which appear, also as a fu ndamental component in the work of the Brentanians. And whilst the iv1achian and Brentanian formulations of this notion are not identical, th ways in whieh they are put to work are in many respects parallel. Mach 's views on how Elemente are related to each other have been adopted by su bsequent philosophers in the positivist tradition (at least in part because , since they involve a denial of any necessary connection, they mesh well with the tenets of empiricism). They have indeed been absorbed to such an extent th at they form an un ques tioned and unanalysed component of present-day philosoph y of science. Mach's cri tic. and interpreters have concentrated in the ir writings much ral her on the Elemente themselves , and the litera ture abounds with refutations of the 'phenomenalism' or 'neutral monism ' which Mach is held to have propounded This aspect of his thi nki ng, too, exerted a powerful influence on the Vienna circle . But the question o f the relations hetween Elemente is clearly no Ie. s important , despite the fact th at it has recei ved so little detailed consideration . It is important not only because Mach was almost certainly the first to have addressed the problem of providing such a theory without appeal to extraneous and ambiguous or unexplained notiofL like that of causality_ 1t is important further because some of his most telling insights, not least those which are of releva nce to the problem DR of comple -perception, are directed precisely towards the project of a general theory of re lations of the given sort . §7. Mach on Variation What, th en . i!; Mach's th eory of th l: relations between Elcmente? To answer this question we must onsider a furth er crucial notion underlying his approach, which a10 has its counterpart in the theories of the Brenla no school: the notion of variatiort. That sci ne ' proceeds by identifyi ng constancies and regularities in what is in flux in reality was a commonplace long before the writi ngs of Mach. oe thinks immediatelyof the writings on method of John Stuart Mill. But Mach gave this conception an important twist. The simple and 00 re flecti n somewhat si mplistic opposition betw en what is constant and what is vari able, is replaced in Mach's theory by the concept of an allpcrva ling ((nd continuous variation. Thus the notion of scientific b ws as simple generalizations has no place within his theory. The object of his res ar hes is always the conti nuous transition from one mosaic of ordered connections to another. His stri kingly elegant and original idea was that all con nection: betwee n elements and all constancy can be understood entirely in terms of the idea of continuous tran si tion o r variation. Science , according to Mach, takes as its starting point the orde rings of phenomena given in experi ence and ass igns appropriate numerical values to these phenom ena in ways whieh refl ec t their dim ensions of variability: T he method of change o r variation presents us with like cases of facts col1t<lining com ponents tha t are part ly thc same and partly different. It is on ly by compari ng di ffe ren t ~ aSL:S of refracted ligh t at changing angles of incidence that the common factor , the constancy of the refractive index, i~ disclosed. And only by comparing the re fr actionsoflightofdiffc rcnt colour does the diffe rence, the inequality of the indices o f refraction, arrest the attention. Comparison bas d on change leads the mind sim ult aneously to the highest a b~traction , and to the finest distinctions . (liN6, p.25R Eng. p .230f.) Science , he argued, works by assigning quantitative values to the varia bles involved) so that scientific laws can be conceived as 'functional' or 'tabular' descriptions of such continuous transitions. 139 Mach 's thesis concerni ng cont i n uous va ria tion can be understood on at least five distinct levels: It is first of all a thesis about the way the world (i .e . the totality of elements) is . It is secondly a thesis about how, within this totality , science actually proceeds or develops, a thesis about the 'economical ' ordering activities of scientis ts . It is thirdly a thesis about the way science ought to proceed : a more adequate grasp of the notion of continuous variation would, IVlach claims, make science more efficient (more economical). It is fourthly a thesis about the continuity of transitions between everyday experience as traditionally and habitually understood and the co nstructions of scientific theories. And finally it is a thesis about the interplay between sense experience which is, in a certain sense, the only true reality -and those indirect , accessory adjuncts to this experience which are scientific theories. Now there is one aspect of Mach's thinking here to which considerable attention has been paid in subsequent literature in the philosophy of science. Mach 's functional descriptions which almost always take the form of differential equations involve no reference to extrinsic notions slIch as causality , space and time . The scientist rather implicitly defines the objects of his research in the very formulation of his equations, and particularly in his choice of variables . 1n this respect Mach can properly be said to have anticipated certain aspects of the conventionalist and operationa list accounts of the nature of science. But Mach was not simply a co nventionalist. For the ordering activities of scientists , their drive to produce economical orderings of functional descriptions, has as its indispensable correlate in the Machian framework the ordered transitions and relations exhibited by the phenomena themselves. §8. Mach on Dependence A first provision al formulation of Mach 's account of the relation of dependence might run as follows: two varia bles (continuously variable quanti ties) are dependent if and only if the variation in one is reflected in a simultaneous variation in the other. One phenomenon is dependent on another precisely when there is a regular covariation of the two. l40 Independence , on the other hand, is signalled by the absence of any regular covariation. Where tabular descriptions reflect constant covariation , there we have dependence amongst the phenomena represented , and thus the proper expression of relations of dependence is in functional equations . 26 It hardly needs pointing out that the notion of necessity , including the spurious necessity involved in so-called relations of causality, is entirely excluded from this framework. The very opposition between what is necessary and what is contingent dissolves in the face of Mach 's commitment to an all-pen/ading and continuous variation. Mach 's notion of dependence is related in the first place to continuous qualitative covariation, but it is quantitative variation whose ordering and presentation is the primary function of science. Science must be quantitative, Mach holds , if it is to be useful (adaptive) at all. Only through numerical equations can we make predictions whicb take us beyond the merely qualitative (i.e. beyond that which , according to Mach, we know already) . Quantita tive de pendencc is a particular, more simple case of qualitative dependence . . . 1n the case of quantitative dependence what we find isa surveyable, intuitive continuum of cases , while in the case of qualitati ve dependence it is always only necessary to consider a number of individual cases by themselves . « 1917) , p.204 , Eng. p.lS0, quoted by Schulzki , p. J 59.) Even when we have to do with qualities (colours, tones) quantitative features of these are available . Classification here is so simple a task that it barely makes itself noticeable and eve n in the case of infinitely fine gradations, ofa continuum offacts, the number system already lies ready to follow as far as is necessary. «1896) , p.438f., Scbulzki, p.1 61) Mach stresses further that dependence or 'constancy [Bestiindigkeit] of covariation' is always relative to the perspective adopted by the investigator or tbeorist. 27 Not all of what is continuously in tlux can of course be grasped in anyone functional description or equation. The scientist rather selects what is to be represen ted from this or that point of view. Scientific theories, the constantly adaptive products of the ordering activities of scientists, set out the connections between those functional descriptions which are revealed by such a process of selection. The latter picks out, for reasons of his own and appealing to convenience, analogy, habit , and so on, certain specific relata, and sets other relata out of account by restricting the range of variation which he will allow for consideration. Thus the gas equation, pvlT = constant, holds 'only for a 141 ga ' ous body of invariable mass for whicb pressure, volume and temperature have the same values in a ll its parts and provided the conditions are distant enough from liquefaction. ' «(1917), p.445, Eng. p.353f.) The law of refraction sina/sinB 'is narrowed by being related to a defin ite pair of homogeneous substances at a definite temperat ure and pressure , as well as to the absence of internal differences of electrical or magnetic pot ntial. ' (loc.cit . ) 21> It is the principal thesis of this paper that the theory of dependence in terms of constan t covariation is inadequate, a thesis we sh all attempt to t1emonstrate in relation to the specific problems associated with O Uf perception of what is complex. First, however , we must re turn to the treatment of dependence by Brentano's successors . §9. Variation and Dependence in the Bl'entano Tradition The writings of Brentano'S pupils on variation and dependence are concerned primarily not, as in Mach 's case, with quantitative and continuous varation; their employment of the notion is to a much lesser extent concentrated around phenomena which fal l within the province of numerical science.29 That there are , nonetheless , parallels with Mach's treatment , both of variation and of dependence, becomes clear when we look at the first important published trea tment of dependence in the Brentano tradition Stumpf's Ober den psychologischen Ursprurzg der Raumvorstellung which deals centrally, like Mach's paper of 1865, with problems associated with the structures of visual perception. 30 All presentations of colour in o ur experience, all 'co lour-co nt nts ', to use Stumpf's term, are bound up with presentations of isual ex tent (with what we might call 'ex tension-contents ')." What is the nature of the relation between colour-contents and extension-contents? Th i relatio n cannot, Stumpf argues, be me rely one of regular but o ntingen t associatiol1like , say, the regular association of'Goetbe' and 'S hi ller'in the minds of German schoolboys. For however we attempt to vary colourand extension-contents in imagination , in memory or in present experience , along all conceivable dimensions , we disco ve r that it is impossible to separate the two . Systematic variati n , Stumpf argues, reveals that the connection of contents of the two given typ . is a necessary connection -of precisely the kind to which appeal was made by 142 .. ~ Mach , ell pas 'af/t , in his paper of 1865. Colour-contents and extensioncontents ar su h that , as a matter of necessity, they cannot occur in isolation from eachother. Wit hin the quantitative , functional framework adopted by Mach in his later writings all such necessary connection is in effect eradicated (or perhaps we should say that its necessity is simply ignored). It would seem that its recognition is made possible only on the basis precisely of qualitative investigations of the type undertaken by the Breotanists , investiga tions in which , further , the ontological and the genetic dimensions are kept clearly separate. J2 The implications of this theory of necessary connection are manifold. As Stumpf points out , from th e necessity of the connection between co lourand extension-contents it follows that it is misleading to conceive thc 'e as separate contents at all: each is, ra ther, something that is in itself intrinsically partial or incomplete , is what Stumpf calls a Teilinhalt . Each slIch par tial content can exist only to the extent that it is supplemented, in the context of a larger whole, by one o r more further partia l contents of a complementary sort. Teilinlzalte which play a role simil ar to that of distinctive features in phonology are, we might say , sub-atomic units of experience. Their recognition thereby signifies a break with atomistic psych ology that is no less rad ical than is the recognition of sui generis psychologica I complexes for it implies that the simplistic notion of atomicity, derived as it was from the corpuscular theories of the Newtonian era, cannot serve within psychology as an adequate basis even for the treatment of simple sensations . The two-sided relation of necessary connection between colour* content and exten io n-conten t is called by Stum pf a relation of mutual dependence , and we note that dependence relations between Teilinhalte of the given sorts have been isolated by Stumpf precisely by a method which involves appeal to a notion of vmiation related to qualitative orderings manifested in experience . The same 'method of variation ' is used by Stumpf also in relation to other kinds of psychic contents toreveal whole families of species of Teilinhalte and twoor n-sided re lations of mutual dependence betwee n them. It is at this point that we see the connection between the two key notions of dependence and variation as these are conceived within the Brentano tradItIon. The work of Husserl directly continues that of Stumpf, elaborating Stumpf's method of systematic variation in such a way that itcould be applied, in principle , beyond the purely psychological 143 sphere. Husserl and his immediate followers extended the method still further, to reveal hierarchies of dependence relations not merely in relation to perceptual phenomena but also in other , highly disparate dimensions of experienced reality. 33 §10. On tbe Concept of Substance Perhaps the most interesting parallels between the respective treatments of dependence and variation of Mach and of the Brentanists are revealed in their analyses of the traditional concept of substance. For Mach, as we have seen, there is 'but one sort of constancy, which embraces all forms , namely constancy of connection' 3 4 This applies particularly to the concept of substance . Substances (bodies) a re not that which is identical through change, they are not that which endures. They are, rather , no more than bundles of reactions connected in a law-governed fashion . The same is true of processes of. every sort ... waves and water which we follow with the eye and with the sense of touch ... , shock-waves in the air which we hear and can only make visible by artificial means ... , electric currents which can be followed in artificially produced reactions. What is constant is always and only the lawgoverned connection between reactions. This is the critically purified concept of substance which science pUIS inlhe place of the vulgar concepl. (Mach , Notizbuch, p.188, as quoted by Schulzki (1980), p .8S , our emphasis; cf. Dingler (1924), p.106.) Thus it is constancy of connection which is at the heart of the Machian concept of substance: 'we term substance what is conditionally constant' (1903, p.256 , Eng. p.328) , and the 'constant connection between reactions expounded in the propositions of physics represents the highest degree of substantiality that enquiry has thus far been able to reveal.' ((1917), p.134, Eng . , p. 99)35 Mach 's views thereby signify also a rejection of the traditional conception of substance as a substrate of properties or bearer of accidents. Now this conception is still very much defended by Brentano, 36 but Meinong, Husserl and Stumpf each puts forward views in opposition to that of Brentano which constitute a rejection of the traditional notion exactly parallel to that of Mach. A substance is, they argue , just a whole 144 consisting of parts standing in relations of dependence, and manifesting constant and variable dimensions . Thus as Meinongonce put it: The nature of substance is to be sought in thefact that it is a complex of, so to speak , mUlually dependent [aufeinander angewiesenefl} properties . (Meinong 1906, p.27) And as Stumpf who had earlier been a colleague of Mach's in Praguewrites in the Erkenntnislehre (sec. 3 .7): substance is a unity of interdependent parts each of which has its own dimension of variation. 37 Or, as he formulates the matter in his autobiography: In the relation between colour and extent I thought T could see (and still think so a striking example of or analogy with the relation which is taken to obtain between tbe properties of substance in metaphysics. (Stumpf 1924 , p.8) Kreibig, a follower ofMeinong, even goes so far as to identify the thing as a specific sort of Gestalt quality: 'A thing is given in perception as the Gestalt quality of a sum of perceived characters ' (1909, p.ll5). The perception of such a quality becomes associated with an existential judgment which ascribes external reality to that which is perceived . 'All other definitions of the thing are purely met.aphysical in nature and alien to an empirical treatment of the problem. '38Stumpf'sstudent Kurt Lewin takes this idea one step further and sees the mind or ego as a mere complex of interdependent parts, of , strong' and 'weak' Gestalten , which are in part in communication with eacb other , in part suchas todiscloseno genuine unity at all. 39 §11. On the Nature of Dependence What , then , is dependence? For the Brentanists the relation of d pe ndence is a r !ation of real necessity, a reflection of structural laws concern ing the nee ssary eoxistence of objects . T he necessity invo lved i~ sui generis; it is neither physical (causal) nor logical (conceptual) . It is ;} necess ity o f a type wh.i ' h is illustrated not merely by the re la tion be tween colour and ex ten ion or between the distinctive fe atures of a ph me me, hu t a lso , for e ampk, by the relatio n between a promise, on the one hand , and a mutually corre lated clai m and o bliga tion on the other (the 145 former cannot, as a mattter of necessity, exist without the latter). In fact t he concept of necessary dependence is a formal concept, a concept which is like the concepts of logic in that it can be applied in principle to all matters, whatever their qualitative determinations. It differs from the concepts offormallogic, however , in being ontological; it is a concept of formal ontology or, as Meinong would put it, of the formal ' theory of objects' . In regard to the Machian theory of necessity we can note first of all that Mach typically opposes logical to physical necessity and seeks to reduce the latter to the former. Closer inspection reveals , however , that by 'logical necessity' he means only psychological necessity , a notion he explicates in terms of always defeasible expectations: There is only logical necessity : if ce rtain properties hold of a fact l Zukommen) .. then 1 cannot simultaneously ignore this . That they hold is simply an experiential fact . There is no such thing as physical necessity. «(11)96) , p .437; cf. rvlusil, p.1) I f., Eng. p .58f.) The agreement of concepts with one another is a iogical\y necessa ry req uirement, and this logical necessity is also the only necessity of which we have knowledge. The belief in a necessity in nature arises only where our concepts are closely enough adapted to nature to ensure a correspondence between logical inference and fact. But the assumption of an adequate adaptation of om ideas can be refuted at any moment by experience. ((1904), p.280; Eng. p .318) In late editions of the Mechanics, Mach replies to HusserJ's criticism that the principle of the economy of thought is unable adequately to comprehend the nature of logical necessity . The account of the economy of thought has to be supplemented, Husser! had argued, by an account of the role offormal concepts. Mach replies as follows: As a natural scientist I am accustomed to investigating individual questions ... and to move from these towards more general qu es tions. I adhered to this custom in investigating the genesis of physical knowledge . I was obliged to proceed in this way because a general theory of theori es was a task which was beyond me ... i therefore concentrated on individual phenomena: the adaptation of thoughts to facts and to one another, thought economy, comparison, thought experiments, constancy and continuity of thought, and so on. I found it both profitable and sobering to consider ordinary thought and all science as a biological and organic phenomenon with logicallhought as an ideal limit case. But he goes on: 146 1 would not want to doubt (or a minute that investigation can begin at either end. And, as this makes clear , 1 am perfectly capable of distinguishing between logical and psychologica.1 quest.ions, a distinction I think everyone is capable of making who IS Interested In the light psychology amongst other things can throw on logical processes. Someone who has once looked carefully at the logical analysis of what Newton says in my Mechanics will find it difficult to reproach me with the attempt to run together blind, natural thought and logical thought. Even if we have the complete logical analysis of all sciences before us , the biological and psychological investigation of their genesis ... would still be needed; although this would not exclude submitting the latter in its turn to logical analysis. ((1904), p.537: Eng. p.S92ff.) . Th us Mach is apparently prepared to concede that the two approachesthe logical and the biological/psychologicalare complementary and do not at all contradict one another. If, however, we look at Mach's deservedly famous 'logical' analyses of Newton, then what we find is in fact conceptual criticism albeit of the highest order4o not any recognition of the role of formal concepts, whether logical or ontological. A letter from Husser! to Mach on receipt of his reply puts the main point clearly: the different formal concepts proposition , implication, some, all, cardinal number, etc. cannot be taken to be 'expressions of empirical generalities', they cannot be explained by the genetic psychology of judging, cognizing, etc., nor by reference to the economy ofthought, for any such attempted explanation would be circular 41 There is in fact a fundamental unclarity in the concept of necessity that is employed by Mach, and thus we can anticipate a corresponding unclarity about what precisely dependence is , an uncl arity which emerges most pointedly in Mach's two papers replies to Planck and Stumpf of (1910). Dependences are, he says , ' real' , 'given ' ; physical dependences differ from psychological dependences in being more 'intrinsic' [innig] , thereby yielding us our concepts of matter . All well and good , as intuitions go. But Mach was unable to produce a th.eory of the different types of dependence which could do justice to intuitions of this sort. Overimpressed by the relativity of a restricted range of examples of dependence conceived as more or less constant covariation, Mach came to see the latter as an exhaustive category whose inner structure is not capable of being further penetrated by science. We have mentioned already that Husser! generalized Stumpf's theory of covariation beyond the sphere of psychic contents. Husserl went beyond Stumpf fi rst of all in recognizing reI a tions of on e-sided in add ition to those of mutual dependence . In this he was embracing an idea already 147 developed by Brentano in his theory of the types of psychic phenomena in the Deskriplive Psych%gie and before him by Aristotle in the th eory of individual accidents. Brentano's ow n examples of one-sided depende nce are couched in the terminology of one -sided separability: a judgment cannot exist in separation from an associated presentation ; a phenom enon of prefe rence or aversion canno t exist in separa tion from an a 'so iated judgm nt , and so on , Other so rt s of examples of one-sided dep ndence migh t be: the dependence of curren t o r charge upon a conductor; f magnetic a ttraction on magne tized body ; of action upon agent; f a depress ion over the Atlantic upon mol ecules of air ; and so on. But all of these examples _. and certain ly a ll the examples treated by BrerHano (and by Stumpf) concern objects existing simultaneously , Bre ntano 's theory is in this sense too narrow. Husser! went further than both Brentano and Stumpf, seco ndl y, in admitting trans-temporal dependence rela tions .42 Now , as we have seen , it was Ehrenfels in "Ober 'G estaltqu alita ten '" who first took the notion of dependence as thi s \-vas to be fou nd in Brenta no and Stumpf and applied itto examples of objects of sense that arespread out in time and to objects of sense that do not ex ist simul taneously or at an instant. In this way he was ab le to produce thefirst truly gene ral theoryofthe perception of complexes , em bracing both visual and (fo r example) aural complexes , both static and dynamic comp lexes, and also hybrid complex ' of variolls kinds 4 3 1 t was in the end however Husser! , in the 3rd Logical investigation , 44 who succeeded in bringing together all of these strands one-sided and mutual dependence and independence within the framework of a single theory. Moreover, it was Husser! who managed to free the theory of dependcnce re lations from the I imitation to psychological example (and to psycb ologically motivated cri te ri a of dependence) and to deve lop the theory as a fo rmal ontology applicable to all material varie ties of objects, exist ing both simultaneou Iy and across time . Huss rI did not , howe e r, ignore t he question of the relation bet cen thi -' forma l o ntology and the fiel d o f psychological examples in "'h ich it has its root. [nd cd his Logical llll'esligaliolls can be said to show the true in dispensabi lity f bot h mutual a nd o ne-sid d dependence to the adequate understandingof the structures of mcntal phenomena , as also )f t he phenomena of language . But how does this leave Mach? Gi en his notion of dependence us 'logica ll y necc sary' constant covariation , Mach . it is clear. annot ac ~ept 14R r 1. even the possibili ty of one-sided dependence, Two or more va riables ca n e ither vary simu ltaneously toge ther, in which case, according to Mach , we have mutual dependence . Or they can fail to vary together , in which case there is no dependellce ar all , A third alternative simply fails to present its If within the tabu la r or functional conception of scien ti fic laws defended f y Mach and, we might add, by almost all subseq uent philo sophers of scie nce , All purported exa mples of one-sided dependence must therefore b' rejected by these philosophers as spuriOllS , to be explained away by a sufficiently deep ana lysis or reduction of the phenom ena in question . And whil the recognition of a re la tion of necessary connection between charl:lcteristic sensa tion and foundat ion was, as we have seen , clearly expres. ed in Mach's 1865 paper , even at that stage , th at is to say befo re the fu ll y worked-out theory of Etem enle , it is clear that Mach was un aware of the peculi a rity of relations of one-sided depe ndence , Within th terms of M' ch 's official th eory of dependence relations the insight in to this peculi iuity simply cannot find expression . Misled by the fac t th at his iew of dependence as co nstant covariation is p lausible for the bulk of th examples he trea ts (e .g. the gas laws45) , Mach adopts a theoretical framework which can no t perm it th e proper formulation of o ther sorts of extlmples , and he thereby misses distinctions which even he would 0(11 ' rwise bave to admit as being crucial. Perhaps the mos t import ant o f these to which we draw a ttent ion nly in passing was dealt with mos t succinctly by Kurt Lewin . It is the dis ti ncti on between wha t migh t be call ed successive and longitudinal causali ty, Thus consider a sente nce such as 'if the temperature ofa gas is ra t ed , then it will expand or its pressure will increase' : The essential meaning of such an asse rtion is this : ev nts a and b a re necessarily depl'lldem moments of a single unifi ed occurrence . T he mathematica l formula sta tes the qUilntita tive rela tio ns involved in the occurrence. A lrt'ady in stich cases the Jep ndellt moment of the occurrence are mornents that obtain temporaliy ~'lde by side. T he part-proc sses in ljuest ion , then , are to be understood as being rel a ted no t by te mporal succession as 'cause' and ' ffect' , but rather in such a way that they are 'b rought into reciprocal fUllcti onal dependence throughout the longitudinal section of the occurrence in question' , (Lewin 1927, p.30S) Two qu ite differe nt so rts of dimension in nature a re 149 involved in these two different forms of causality : Mach is able to gi ve a clear account of neither. §u. Epilogue The implications of Mach 's commitment to a universal mutual dependence are far-reaching. In relation to the concept of time, for example, it leads to a position that is difficult to distinguish from a Spinozistic pantheism , a view of the world which would make everything dependent on everything else (the night, in which all cows are black). As Musil writes , expounding Mach's theory: space and time are themselves concepts for certain connections between phenomena: the oscillations of a pendulum, for example, take place in time only if its excursion depends on th e position of the earth and so he re th e measurement of time amounts to measurement of angles or lengths of arcs. If we imagine the natural course of different events represented by equations involving time , then time may be elimin ated from these equations (for example , an excess of temperature may be determined by space traversed by the falling body); the phenomena then appear simply as dependent on one another. It is therefore superfluous to emphasize time and space, since tempora l and spatial relations merely reduce to dependences between the phenomen a . Thus the equations of physics refer to a very general co nn ection. For to be a function of time now means to be dependent on certain spat ial positions; and th at all spa tial positions are functions of time means that from the point of view of the cosmos all spatial posit ions depend OIl one another; but ~ince spati al positioIls ca n only be recognized by reference to states we can also say that all states depend on o lle another. In our ideas of time , then , the profoundest and most universal co nnection of thi ngs fi nds expression. The same is true of our ideas of space, for every motion of a body K is a motion towards other bodies A, B, c. .. , and even if one says that a body preserves unchanged its direction a nd velocity in space this co ntains a reference to the need to take into account th e whole world. (Musil190R, p.n, Eng. p.52) We have quoted Musil at such length , first of all in order to draw attention to the fact that our criticisms of Mach , here, are very much Musilian in spirit. But also because of the candour with which Musil expresses the implications of Mach 's views. The theory of time presented in this passage carries the implication that Mach could not introduce a notion of one-sided dependence into his system by the back door , by 150 appealing to trans-lemporalvariation , such that a later variation would be non-reciprocally dependent upon an earlier. In fact, Mach identifies all attempts to sta te a depende nce relation across time with attempts to save the banished notion of causality. But this signifies that the three dimensions of the temporal and the atemporal, of the possible and the necessary , andofthe causal and thenon-causal are , in effect, confounded within Mach's functional framework, where the more careful approach of Ehrenfels and of the other Brentania ns had made it possible to keep them apart. Only a t one point does Mach recognize , in passing, that the commitment to unive rsal mutual de pendence does not exhaust all purely analytic possibilities , 'But we do not' , he says , ' need to see any metaphysical problem in this' ((1904) , p .548; E ng. p .35l). Here as elsewhere his faith lies in the possibi lity that when all intervening variables are spelled out e.g, between friction and heat we shall be left with a system expressible entirely in terms offunctional equations . But he is here directly contradicting his own principle that what is given in experience should be taken at face value . As Musil points out (op.cit . , p 77, Eng. p.SS) , the direct generation of heat through friction does not correspond to any direcl gene ration in the opposite direction. The directionality or irreversibility of certain re lations of dependence is given in experi ence. It is on ly in virtue of an impoverished theory of dependence that Mach can overlook this. Notes I Revised and expanded E nglish ve rsio n of " Mach und Ehrenfels : Ube r Gcstaltqualit [ite n und das Problem der Abhangigkeit" , in R. Fabian, ed. , Christian von Ehren/ell'. Leben und Werk , Amsterdam: Rodopi, 19R5, 85-111 . We have provided o nly relative ly br ief indicat.ions of the relevant Gestaltist litera ture here: the reader is invited to supp lement the references provided by turning to the Bibliography at the end of this volume. R eferences io items in this bibliography are given by au tho r and yea r wirhow parentheses; references in which th e year is surro unded immediately by pare nth eses - 'B renlano (1895)', etc. designate items in the list on pp. 155f. be low. 2 Note that , precisel y speaking, Brentcmo an d hi s students make up not a school but a loose associat ion , a fact marked in what foll ows by our talking of ' the 151 . ~ , . Brentano tradition ', ' Brentano and his heirs ', etc . O n the influence of this tradition : see Smith, ed. 1982. On its unifying ph ilosophi cal feat ures , see Mulligan (1980) and Mulligan (1986). 1 Note, however , Stumpf's remark (1939/40 , I, p.243f.) to the effect that th e di o veries of the Gestalt psychologists have led to false and exaggerated accusations tha t lYth century psychology was purely summ ative or atomistic . The assumption holds good , he points out, only in certain cases: e.g. Taine and the English associationi st psychologists. It is not true of e.g. Lotze and James. 4 1886, p.18, Eng. trans . , p.20. 5 As Gus tav B ergmann points out , Mach belo ngs with Meinong he could have mentioned all Bre ntano's heirs to the first group of philosophers who took seriously ' the introspective irreducibility' of certain ' relational charact rs ' ((1950), p.7) (, Cf. Meinong ( 1965) , p.74. Mach does not mention the] 865 paper by name. 7 A s SpinoZ'l (Ethics, HI , Propositio n 2, Scholium) puts it: ' No oll e has yet de term incd what the body is capable of. .. For no one has ye t co me to know so exactly the s tru ctu re [{obriea 1 of the body that he cou ld expla in a ll its functio ns .' 8 The passage in question is discussed in Becher 1911 , pp.238ff. , who poi nts to the impo rtance o f Mach's 'hypothesis of idcntical accompanying phenomena ' fo r the treatmen t of tbe prob lem of mind a nd body. Becher point out also howevcr tha t this hypothesis goes beyond what is given in experience. See also Kei ler 1982a, p .255 , who sees in the hypothesis an anticipation of Kohler's isomorphism th eory. 'I Thi~ is in co ntrast to Husser! in the Philosophie der Ari:hll1etik of 1891, whose views in this respect a re too often overhas til y identified with thoseofEh renfels . See the discuss ion in §3 of the essay by Sm ith , above . 10 On the importance of the peculiarities oftemporal Gesta lte n for the early wo rk o U he Be rlin school see Ash 1982 , pp .296f 11 Eng. p .287 of 1959 ed. Conside r also the following passage, which illustrates clearly the co nnection betWeen nervous quole and bodily movement: To the three optical space-coordi nates, viz., to the sensations of height , breadth, ;lnd depth , corresponds .. . simply a three-fo ld innerva ti on, which turns the eyes to the rightono the left, rai ses or lowers them , and causes them to co nverge , a cording to the respcctive needs of the casc . . . Whethe r we regard the innervation itself "5 the spact:cnsation, or whe ther we conceive the space-sensation as ulterior to the innefvJ tion lis] a questio n neither easy nor necessa ry to decide . (1886, p.77f.. Eng. p.l69f. ) !l In his two papers of (1910), particularly where he is rep.ly ing to crit icis ms of e.g. Stumpf, we do e ncoun ter refe rences to an 'innigs;e Zusammenhang ', a notion which may be descended from the earl ie r notion ofa 'neccssary connection' , but these references play no effect ive ro le wi thi n Mach's later theory. In particuiar . Mach makes it clear in these papers th a t such con nections are mer Iy pervasive a nd very frequent , and th at they are 'necessary' exclus ive ly in this se nse (i. e . not necessary at all ) . i.1 The Munich psycho logist Cor neliu s, in his own paper "Ober 'Gesta ltqualitii te n '" of 1900, critic izes bot h Ehrenfels and Mach for havi ng drawn the wrong inferences from the existe nce of perceived similarity. 152 ... '.1: -.;. .. Ehrenfels was wrong, he held, for having conceived the Gestalt quali ty as a 'posit ive content of p resenta tio n' supe radded to our perception of wha t is given o n the le vel of sensation . And Mach was wrong fo r having missed the fact that feeling, too, whethe r muscular or non-muscular , an; themse lves varieties of Gcst a lt qualiti e~. *or Cornelius, talk of G estalt q ualities is a mere roundabout wa of referr ing to simila rity of complexesofsens8tions, which sho uld simply be accepted as a primitive phenomenon. 14 Of course more presen tations wil l be invol ved also in virt ue of the workin£!s of mem.ory, which are req uired if the Gestalt-pre e ntat ion is to be constitllt~'ci at all; but we shaill ca vc this I1Jattcr aside in what follows since it bears no relatio n to our principal concerns . 15 That there are two distinct d imensions he re. is se n if we consider , for example, the re lation between a child a nd his mother (or betwee n God and His CreCltion). The child is genetica lly dependent upon its mother ,cou ld no t ha ve begun to exis{ unless the mother existed . Bu t the child is clearly not depen dent fo r its co nt inuing to ex ist upon the continued existence of its mother. See Inga rde n (1 904/65) for the definitive p hilosophical treatm e nt of this distinction. 1(, Roughly: 11 is one-sided ly dependent on b if and o nly if a is such that , as a matter of necessit , it cannot ex ist u!1less b exists but not conversely. a is two-sidedly m utually) dependen t o n b if an d only i f a a nd b are necessa ril y such th at neither can xist with ut the ther . Clear! y mutual dependence ca n hold a lso in relation to any plurality of o bjt:cu; , howe e r large. See Smith , ed. 1982 for further deta ils . In the erman version of this paper , where we concen trated rather o n the geneti c question , it was suggested erroneously that E hre nfcb di d not use the notion of one-sided dependence. See, however, p. 88 above. 17 S c §5 of the pap "f by Smith, above. Interest ingly E brenfe ls, in his paper o n G estalt qu alities of 1932 tran:lated above , al li es his own earlier wo r k with that of t he p rod uction theo rists, though this re lro 'pective interpreta tion seems not to be u ppo rted by th text of the paper of 1890. IS Cf.. again , Smith, ed . 1982 , esp. th e diagra m on p.482 . 19 eee .g. Feycrabend(19 O), pp262-68. 20 Note tha t man.y , if no t all, of Mach 's ina ugura ting oncepts are ordi na l in nature: tha t is, they have to do with intensive magnitudes . See Bradley (1971) , ch. II , on " Metrical oncepts". 21 See e.g. Mach (1896) , p.452f., (1417). pp.446, 449f. , Eng. pp .348. 351f. 22 2} Compar' Brentano (1968) , p .58, and also the following passage fro m Huss rl: Depth lTiel~inn] is a mark of chaos which genuine ~cie nce aims to transform into a cosmos, into a simple , completeiy clear, anaJysed order. Genuine science knows no dept h as fa r as its actual the ry extends. Every piece of accomplished science is a whole made up of steps of thought each o f which is immediately evident and hence not at ail 'deep'. Deplh isa matter ll f wisdom. conceptual univocity ;md clarity ~ matte r of rigorous thec)fY. ( 19 i 1) , p. 144 of th e translation) Wittgens te in (1953),11, xiv. Compure also the following discuss ion by Kohler of the ' puzzie ' of external perception: 153 Although allegedly founded on processes in my interior, such percepts as tree, house, cloud , moon and thousands of others are clearly localized outside of me ... Only a few authors, mostly men of great phenomenological power. have been able to recognize the apparent puzzle as whal it really is: a mosI unfortunate pseudoproblem produced by inconsistl'l1t thinking. Such men were E. Hering , the physiologist, and E . Mach, the physicist and philosopher. (Kohler 1938, pp .126f.) Hering's important role in the early development of Gestalt psychology , above all in the matter of experimental approach , has been stressed above all by Ash (1982, pp.87-108). See especially Hering's Outlines ofa Theory oflhe Lighl Sense of (1905). Hering's work contains considerations of the relationship of psychology and physiology and of the physiological correlates of perception related in important ways to those of Kohler 1920. 24 See H. Llibbe's "Positivismus und Phanomenologie" of 1972, an excellent account of the phenomenology of the Analysis of Sensations. See now a.lso Sommer (1985). 25 Cf. Kraus' remarks in Brentano (1924 /25),1 , p.xvii, and, for a fuller treatment, Brentano's Deskriptive Psychologie (1982). On the parallels between the B rentanian opposition between descriptive and genetic psychology and the synch ronic/diachronic opposition of de Saussure see S. Raynaud (1982). 26 Compare the papers of Grelling and Oppenheim and the discussion by Simons below. 27 See "1903 , p.256, Eng., p .328~ and cOlnpare Musil , pp.70f. ~ Eng. pp .5 1 f 2K On the ideal gas example and other examples of 2- ~ 3and n-dimensional manifolds see Weyl (1918), p. 75, and on this Stumpfl939/40 , ~c~ 26.3 , pp .649f. It seems indeed that the object investigated and the investigating obscrver will in a certain sense inlerpenetrGte: An element such as the warmth of a body A hangs not merely together with other elemen t whose aggregate we designate e.g. asa flame B ; il hangs also together with the totalityofthe elements o f ou r body e.g. of a nerve N. (Meclwnik, 6th ed. , p .554, 9th cd. , p.484, Eng. p.6l2) 29 Exceptions would be the experimental work of Meinong, Stumpf and their pupils , above all Stumpfs quantitative investigat ionsi n acoustics and Senussi 's work on Gestalt perception )0 Stumpf's ideas on dependence in this work almost certainly derive from ideas presented by Srentano in the al readymen tioned lectures on descriptive psychology. Mulligan and Smith (1985) is an account of this latter work that is complementary to the present essay. 3 1 Compare e.g. 1886, p.41 , Eng. p.103 , and also James (1879) and (a corrective to James) Rubin (1977) . 32 See, again, Smith, ed. 1982, esp. pp.25-35 and Mulligan (1986). 33 Indeed the project of Husserlian phenomenology can itself be described as being that of uncoveringalbe it from a particular epistemological point of view .the various families of dependence structures involving consciousness. 34 [886, p .157 , Eng. p .331, our emphasis; cf. also 1903, p.258 , Eng. p.331. :15 Cf. also the following passage from Erkennfnis und [rrfum : 154 ..... j .~. J } '. ;';' When an equalion is satisfi ed, th en there is involved therein a widened and generalized concept of substance . .. [n general it matters little whether we regard the equations of phy;;ics as expressions concerning substances (laws or forces) , for at all events they express functional dependences. «l 'l 17) , p277, Eng. p.207f.) .16 Cf. Brentano (1933), pp. J 40 , 274, Eng. pp.lOR, 194 (criticisms of Mill and Herbart). See also Chisholm (1978), Mulligan (1985), and Smith (1987) J7 It is interesting at this point to compare Musil's sketch of this Stumpfian conception in his critique of Mach of 1908, pp.54f. , Eng. pp.42f. 38 See also pp. 11Sff. for Kreihig's criticisms of the traditional concept of substance. .19 Lewin 1926, pp .32f. of Separaturn. -II) Thus for example Mach's criticism of Newton 's definition of mass in terms of density and volume is that it is circular (( 19(4), ch.2.111, 95, Eng. , p.237). To appreciate the importance of Stich criticisms we need only think of thei r influence on Einstein . 41 In the same letter Husser! emphasizes the one-sidedness both of Mach's approach and 01' hi s own. This idea seems to have impressed Mach , and he returns to it in later work. See (1917) , p282, Eng. p. 212. On 'logic' in Mach see further Musil , pp. 92f., Eng., p,64f. 42 See Mulligan and Smith (1986), for further details. 43 Ehrenfels saw for example that there exist hybrid Gestalten embracing both physical and psychical components corresponding to verbs Stich as 'murder' , 'promise' , 'threaten', 'suffer', etc. describing complex (lctions . 44 A start was made already in Husserl 's paper of 1894. 4.\ Compare again the p<:lssages from Weyl and Stumpf mentioned in n.n above. References Bergmann, G. (1950) " Logical Positivism" in V. Ferm, ed, Hislory of Philosophical Systems, New York: Philosophical Library, 47\ .. 82 , as repr. in The Metaphysics of Logical Posilivism , Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, 1-16. Bradley, J. (1971) Mach's Philosophy of Science , London : Athlone Press. Brentano, F . (1895) Meine IClz len Wiinsche jiir Osterreich , Stuttgart: Cotta. - (1924/25) Psychologie vom empirischcll Standpun.kl, (1st cd., 1874), 2nd cd ., introduction and notes by O. Kraus, Leipzig: Meiner; Eng. trans. Psych 0 fogy from an Empirical Standpoint, by L. L. McA liste r et al., London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1973. - (1933) Kacegorienlehre . eel. F. Mayer-Hiliebrand, Leipzig: Meiner; Eng. trans by R. M. ChishoJmandN. Guterman, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981. - (1968) Die vier Phasen der Philosophie, 2nd ed. , Hamburg: Meiner. - (1982) Deskriptive Psychologie, ed . R. M. Chisholm and W.Baurngartner, Hamburg : Meiner. 155 Chisholm , R. M . (1978) " Brentano 's Conception of Substance and Accident" , in Die Philosophie Franz Brenlanos, Amsterdam: Rodopi (Grazer Phifosophische Studiell, 5) ,197-210. Din, Ic r, H . (1924) Die Grundgedanken der IHachsci1cll Philosophic, Lcipzig: Barth. Feyaahc nd , P. (1980) Erkenlllllis f iir freie Menschen, Frankfurt: Suh rb mp. I-k ring , E . (1905) Grundzuge ZII r Lehre Ilorn Lichlsinl/e, Berlin: Springer, Eng. tran s. as Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense , ambridge , Mass .: H arvard U nivers it P ress , 1964. H lisscrl, £."(1911) " Philosophic als strenge Wis5e nschaft", Logos, 1,289-341; E ng. trans. in Husserl, Phenomenology alld the Crisis of Philosophy, ed. Q. La uer , New York: Harper and Row , 1965,71 -148. Ingarlien , R. (1964/65) Ocr Streit urn die Ed\'tellz der Well , 2 vols., the 2nd in 2parts , Tiibinge n : Neimeyer . Ja llles , W. (1 879) "The Spatial Quale" , Journ{/ l oj SPI!Cuiulive Philosuphy, 13 . Mach, E . (1 872) Die Geschich te und die Wurzel des Sf1Ize ~ von der Erhalw.ng de/' Arbeil , Prague: J. G. Ca lve; Eng. trans. as Histo ry and Root ofrhe Principle of the Conservation oj Energy , by P. B . Jourdai n , Chicago: O pe n Court , 191 J . - (I H96) Die Prinzipier! del' Wdrrnelehre , hislorisch-krilisch en/wickeil, 1st ed ., Le ipzig: Barth, (2nd ed., 19(0); E ng. trans forthcomin g. - (1904) Die Mechanik in ihrer Enlwicklung, histurLI'cl1 -krilisch darge.l'teill. 5th ed. , L 'ipz ig : Brockhaus ; Eng. truns. of 9th ed . . The Seienc of t'vl clianics: A Crili al and Historical Accounl afils Del'eloprnellt, by T. J. McCormack , with an illlroduction by Karl Menge r, Chicago: Open Court, 1960 . - (1910) "Die Leitgedal1ken mei ner naturwissenschaftlichc n E rke nnl nisJch re und ih r A ufnahme durch die Zeitgc nossen ", Physikalisdre Zeitschrtft . J 1, 19 10, 599-606 (repr. J91 9 with 1910a. ) ; Eng. truns . as "T he Guidi ng Principles of my Scientifi c Theo ry of Knowledge an d its Recep tion by my C o ntemporar ies", inS . Toulmin ,ed . , Physical Reality , New York : Harper, 1970 . pp. 2R-43 . - (l 9 lOa) "Si nnliche Elemente und naturwisscnschaftliche Begriffe" , Archiv liir Physiologie , 136,263-74. - ( 1917) £rkenn lrris lind Irrtum . Skizzen ZlIr P,lychologic del' F(ln-chung . :ltd ed . , Leipzig : Barth ; Eng, trans. of 5th cd . . Knowledge Clnd Error, by P 'oulkes and T. J . McCormack, Dordrecht: Reide L 1976. Me inong, A. ( 1906) Uber die Sfeliung der Gegensland.l'llu:oric im System dcr Wi. 'senschajfen, Leipzig: Voigtlander. Repr. in Meino ng, Gesamtausgabe , YO\. V . - (1965) Philosophenbriele, cd. R . Kindinge r, G raz: Akademische Druckund V r1agsanstalt. Mulligan . K. (1980) Representation and Ontology in A US/To-German Philosophy. Disserta tio n , University of Ma ncheSler . - (1985) '''Wie die Sachen sich zueinande r verha lten' inside and nut iel the Traetafus", in Wil1genslein and C()lItemporary Philosophy_ (Teoria , cel. B . H cGuinnessan d A . Gargani. V), 145-174. - (1986) ,. x3ctness, Description and Variation: How Austrian Analytic Philosoph y Was Done", From Bolzano to Wittgenstein: The Tradilioll of Austrian Philosophy. (ed . J . C. Nyiri), Vie nna: Ve rlag Hcilde r-Pichler T em psky, ii6-97. 156 Mulliga n, K. and milh , B. (i 985) "Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind" , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 45,627 -40. - (1 9t56) Review of Busserl 's L ogisclle Untersuchungen, in Grazer Philosophische SlUdien , 27, ]99-207. Rayn aud, S (1982) AlllolI Marty, FilosoJo del Linguaggio. Uno struuuralismo presaussuriallo, Romc : La 'oliardica Edi trice. Rubin, B. (1977) "'The Spatial Quale': a Corrective to James ' Radical E mpiricism " , Journal afrhe History of Philosophy, 15, 212-1 6. Schulzki, E. (1 980) Der Mensch als Elementenkomplex und als denk-6lwflomische Einheit. Zur Anthrapa/ogie Ernst Machs , Dissertat ion, Munster. Smith, B. (1 987) "The Su bstance of Bren tan o 's Ontoiogy", TopOl (special Brentano issue, ed. R . M. C hisholm and R. Haller) ,6/1, 39-49. So mmer, M . (1985) Husser! und derfi'rihe Positivisl11us, F ran k furt: Kl osiermann . Weyl, H . (J928) Raum, Zeil, Materie. Vorleslingen iibeT allgemeine Relativilii/sIhcorie, Berlin: Springer. Wittgenstc in, L. (1953) Philosophical 1/1 vestigatiol1s, Oxford: B lack well.